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TORT LAW-GOVERNMENT LIABILITY-STRICT LIABILITY UN­
DER THE MASSACHUSETTS TORT CLAIMS ACT-Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann. ch. 258 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the July 20, 1978 enactment of the Massachusetts Tort 
Claims Act l (MTCA), Massachusetts was one of five jurisdictions 
retaining a strict doctrine of government immunity.2 The MTCA, 
similar in some respects to the Federal Tort Claims Act3 (FTCA) , 
abolished the common-law doctrine of government immunity.4 Al­
though the government clearly is liable in negligence under the 
MTCA, 5 whether strict liability may be applied to government ac­
tivity is still open for discussion. 
This note will examine both the propriety of applying strict lia­
bility to government activity in Massachusetts and the sources of 
authority for doing so. These issues will be clarified by a prelimi­
nary discussion of two topics: The history of government immunity 
from its common-law roots to its legislative abolition and the 
common-law doctrine of strict liability. 
1. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). The Massachusetts 
Tort Claims Act [hereinafter referred to as MTCA] was an amendment to the Gen­
eral Laws, replacing the earlier version of chapter 258. 
§ 1. Definitions ... 
"Public employer", the commonwealth and any county, city, town or 
district, and any department, office, commission, committee, council, board, 
division, bureau, institution or agency thereof [which] exercises direction 
and control over the public employee, but not a private contractor with any 
such public employer, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, the 
Massachusetts Port Authority, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, or any 
other independent body politic and corporate. 
§ 2. Liability; ... 
Public employers shall be liable for injury or loss of property or per­
sonal injUly or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of 
any public employee while acting within the scope of his office or employ­
ment, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual un­
der like circumstances, ... and shall not be liable for ... any amount in ex­
cess of one hundred thousand dollars.... 
2. Note, Governmental Tort Immunity in Massachusetts: The Present Need for 
Change and Prospects for the Future, 10 SUFFOLK L. REV. 521, 524 (1976). The 
other four jurisdictions were Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id. 
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976). 
4. Note, Sovereign Immunity in Massachusetts, 13 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877, 877 
(1978). 
5. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). 
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II. HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY 
A. Massachusetts Law Prior to the MTCA 
Prior to the MTCA's enactment, government immunity in 
Massachusetts had two components: Sovereign immunity and mu­
nicipal immunity.s The United States Supreme Court first recog­
nized sovereign immunity in dicta in the 1821 case of Cohens v. 
Virginia. 7 The doctrine was widely accepted because it furthered 
two public policies. The first of these policies was to free govern­
ment administration from the hindrance of liability for acts per­
ceived by the public as tortious. 8 Second, sovereign immunity 
guaranteed that public funds raised through taxation were used to 
benefit the general public and not to compensate individuals who 
suffered tortious injury as a result of government activity. 9 Under­
lying these policies was the belief that, even if such compensation 
were appropriate, the expense to the government would be crip­
pling.lO Massachusetts' common-law sovereign immunity rule, reit­
erated most recently in Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth U 
in 1973, stated that the state is immune from tort liability unless it 
consents to be sued by either statute or supreme judicial court de­
cree. 12 
The second kind of government immunity recognized in the 
Commonwealth, municipal immunity, originated in Mower v. In­
habitants of Leicester. 13 The municipal corporation in Mower was 
found immune from common-law tort liability for neglect of a duty 
owed to the general public that caused injury to an individual. 14 
. From its origin in Mower, municipal immunity in Massachusetts 
developed two facets.15 First, when the municipality assumed a 
function of the state for the benefit of the general public, the mu­
nicipality also "borrowed" the state's sovereign immunity. IS The 
6. Note, supra note 2, at 522. 
7. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 369 (1821). 
8. Note, supra note 2, at 532. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
II. 363 Mass. 612, 296 N.E.2d 461 (1973). 
12. Id. at 615, 296 N.E.2d at 463. The earlier version of MASS. GEN. LAws 
ANN. ch. 258 (West 1959) provided that certain miscellaneous and relatively minor 
claims could be satisfied only with the government's consent. 
13. 9 Mass. 247 (1812). 
14. Id. at 249. 
15. Cambridge v. Commissioner, 357 Mass. 183, 186, 257 N.E.2d 782, 785 
(1970). 
16. Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 380 (1877). 
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second facet of municipal immunity developed from a principle ex­
pressed in Bolster v. City of Lawrence:17 if a municipal act is for 
the common good and the municipality gains no special corporate 
advantage or profit from it, the municipality is immune from lia­
bility regardless of its assumption of a state function. 18 The histor­
ical discussion of municipal immunity19 in Whitney v. City of 
Worcester20 presented the ultimate common-law rule on the sub­
ject: a municipality is immune from liability for injuries resulting· 
from the tortious acts of its officers or employees when they are 
performing public functions, whether the functions are required or 
permitted by the legislature, and when no particular corporate ad­
vantage, pecuniary profit, or enforced contribution from particu­
larly benefitted individuals results. 21 
Whitney incorporated one theme set forth previously in 
Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Comrrwnwealth:22 Abolition of the immu­
nity defense. In 1973 Morash forecasted the end of government 
immunity though the supreme judicial court refrained from abol­
ishing the defense at that time. The court stated that, although it 
had the power to abrogate government immunity, abolition was a 
task better suited to the legislature. 23 In the four years following 
this hint to the legislature, however, the court declined three op­
portunities to abrogate government immunity.24 During this period 
17. 225 Mass. 387, 114 N.E. 722 (1917). 
18. Id. at 390, 114 N.E. at 724. 
19. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 213-14, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 
1213-14 (1977). 
20. 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977). 
21. Id. at 214-15, 366 N.E.2d at 1214-15. The exceptions to municipal immunity 
created by the statutes and case law lessened the harshness of municipal immunity, 
which had left tortiously injured plaintiffs totally without a remedy. An action for re­
lief from unwarranted exclusion of a child from public school was created by statute. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 16 (West 1969). The statutes created an action for 
damages for personal injury a:nd property loss resulting from road defects. Id. ch. 84, 
§ 15. Similarly, an action for damages for loss of life resulting from road defects was 
created by statute. Id. ch. 229, § 1. The statute also provided an action allowing re­
covery for property damage resulting from riot. Id. ch. 269, § 8 (repealed 1962). In 
Kurtigian v. City of Worcester, 348 Mass. 284, 203 N.E.2d 692 (1965), plaintiff, who 
was hit by a tree limb from a negligently maintained tree on city property, was al­
lowed to recover on a theory of private nuisance despite the city's immunity from 
negligence actions. In Miles v. City of Worcester, 154 Mass. 511, 28 N.E. 676 (1891), 
an encroaching city wall was held to constitute a nuisance for which the city was 
found strictly liable despite immunity from an action in trespass. 
22. 363 Mass. 612, 296 N.E.2d 461 (1973). 
23. Id. at 624, 296 N.E.2d at 468. 
24. In Hannigan v. New Gamma-Delta Chapter of Kappa Sigma Fraternity, 
Inc., 367 Mass. 658, 327 N.E.2d 882 (1975), plaintiff pleaded, in part, that her fall 
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the legislature unsuccessfully attempted to pass several abolition 
bills. 25 
In Whitney, decided in 1977,26 the court took two major steps 
toward the abolition of government immunity. The court an­
nounced that government immunity would be abrogated judicially 
if the legislature did not make a pronouncement in the area by the 
end of the next legislative session. 27 Whitney also intimated that 
judicial abrogation might be retroactive to Morash. 28 According to 
one commentator, the legislature feared that retroactive abrogation 
of government immunity would have an adverse effect on the vot­
ers and taxpayers.29 The dicta in Whitney, threatening retroactive 
abrogation, thus provided impetus for legislative action. 30 
The Whitney court took a second major step toward the aboli­
tion of government immunity by proposing a scheme of govern­
ment liability.3! Under Whitney judicial inquiry would shift from 
the nature of the government enterprise as a whole to the specific 
act or omission complained of as tortious. 32 Whitney discarded gov­
ernment immunity but also suggested the limits of liability. 33 
Whitney chose to immunize those government activities that 
traditionally had fallen within the discretionary function excep­
and injury on a state college campus were due to the negligence of the Common­
wealth. The court stated that it would continue to refrain from abolishing govern­
ment immunity until the legislature either acted or demonstrated an intent not to act. 
Id. at 662, 327 N.E.2d at 885. In Caine v. Commonwealth, 368 Mass. 815, 335 
N.E.2d 340 (1975), plaintiff, who sought damages in a wrongful death action, claimed 
that the death of her intestate was caused by the state's negligence in failing to re­
move an unnatural accumulation of ice from a highway. The court again refused to 
abolish government immunity, noting that the legislature had not yet demonstrated 
an intent of inaction. Id. at 816, 335 N.E.2d at 341. Accord, Piotti v. Commonwealth, 
370 Mass. 386, 348 N.E.2d 425 (1976), in which Plaintiff appealed from a judgment 
awarding her maximum compensation under the Crime Victim's Compensation Act, 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A (West Cum. Supp. 1981) and sought additional 
damages. Plaintiff alleged that the state's negligence in allowing two juveniles to es­
cape from custody caused the death of the decedent. The court refused to override 
the legislature's statutory limitation of the Commonwealth's liability, which was es­
sentially a partial immunity. 370 Mass. at 388,348 N.E.2d at 427. 
25. Note, supra note 4, at 877. 
26. 373 Mass. at 208,366 N.E.2d at 1210. 
27. Id. at 210,366 N.E.2d at 1212. 
28. ld. 
29. Johnedis, The Supreme Judicial Court and Tort Immunity, 63 MASS. L. 
REV. 75, 81 (1978). 
30. ld. 
31. 373 Mass. at 216, 366 N.E.2d at 1215. 
32. ld. at 218, 366 N.E.2d at 1216. 
33. ld. at 216, 366 N.E.2d at 1215. 
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tion. 34 Thus, immunity was established for acts involving discretion 
and judgment and the weighing of policy alternatives. 35 The 
Whitney court proposed seven factors that could be used to de­
termine whether liability should attach: Categorization of the tor­
tious conduct as government planning or policymaking; endanger­
ment of efficient government process by imposition of tort liability; 
usurpation of executive or legislative power through judicial review 
of the conduct; availability of an alternative remedy other than an 
action for damages; reasonable expectations of the injured person 
with respect to the responsible government entity; the nature of 
the duty running between the government and the individual; and 
the nature of the injury.36 The court concluded that, in cases where 
these seven factors are not determinative, government liability 
should be the general rule. 37 Whitney, in holding that government 
liability was the general rule, set the stage for the enactment of the 
MTCA. 
B. The MTCA 
As a result of the judiciary's prodding in Whitney the legisla­
ture enacted the MTCA on July 20, 1978. 38 The MTCA holds pub­
lic employers liable for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions 
of their employees in the same manner as a private individual un­
der similar circumstances. 39 The MTCA defined the term "public 
employer" broadly to include the numerous government entities in 
the Commonwealth. 40 
A primary rule of statutory interpretation is that strong consid­
eration should be given to legislative intent41 as manifested in a 
specific statement of purpose or as implied from legislative his­
tory.42 The objective is to interpret a statute in accordance with 
the stated or implied intent of the enacting body. 43 
Though the legislative history of the MTCA is virtually nonex­
34. Id. at 217,366 N.E.2d at 1216. 
35. Id. at 218-19, 366 N.E.2d at 1216. 
36. Id. at 219,366 N.E.2d at 1217. 
37. Id. 
38. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. See note 1 supra for text of §§ 1 
& 2 of the MTCA; notes 104-05 infra for §§ 4 & 5; note 117 infra for § 10; and note 
109 infra for § 11. 
39. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). 
40. Id. § 1. 
41. United States Y. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 53 (1942). 
42. United States y. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941). 
43. United States y. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1942). 
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istent,44 the legislature's intent may be drawn from specific state­
ments of purpose. Very brief statements of purpose are found in 
two places. The sponsors of the original bill stated that their pur­
pose was "to abolish government immunity."45 The session laws46 
delineate the scope of construction: "[t]he provisions of this act 
shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes 
thereof. . . . "47 These brief statements of legislative intent suggest 
that the legislature wanted the MTCA to be construed liberally to 
abolish government immunity. When the MTCA is construed lib­
erally, strict liability becomes applicable to government activity. 
Because section 2 of the MTCA states in part that the government 
is "liable ... in the same manner ... as a private individual,"48 
strict liability as applied to individuals must be examined to clarify 
the issues underlying strict liability's application to the govern­
ment.· 
III. DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY 
Strict liability has been defined as liability without fault. 49 The 
concept of fault, violation of a standard of due care, became the 
most important component of liability in Anglo-American law dur­
ing the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen­
turies. ~o In 1868, however, a gradual erosion of the fault concept 
began. 51 In Rylands v. Fletcher52 the House of Lords held that 
those who use their land in unusual and extraordinary ways should 
provide some protection to their neighbors for losses that might 
occur. A common theme recurred as the fault doctrine was eroded 
and the doctrine of strict liability arose: liability began to be as­
44. Note, supra note 4, at 879. The bill originated in the House as H.R. 1394 on 
January 4, 1978. A survey of numerous sources, including the bill's sponsors, the Leg­
islative Research Bureau in Boston, and the Committee on the Judiciary, unearthed 
no historical material which gives a definitive statement of legislative intent. 
45. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES H.R. 1394,2330 (1978). 
46. "Session laws" is the name given to the body of laws enacted by a state 
legislature at one of its annual or biennial sessions. The term session laws is used to 
distinguish the body of laws from the compiled or revised statutes of the state. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (5th ed. 1979). 
47. 1978 MASS. ACTS ch. 512, § 18. 
48. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). 
49. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1591 (4th ed. 1968). 
50. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 75,492 (4th ed. 1971). 
5l. Id. at 494 n.25 (referring to Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 E. & I. App. 330 
(1868)). 
52. L.R.3 E. & I. App. 330 (1868). 
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, 
signed not so much on the basis of fault but on the basis of who 
could best bear the risk. 53 
In general tort law, strict liability may be applied to six types 
of individual activity. When a nuisance arises and it creates an ab­
nonnally dangerous situation, strict liability is triggered. 54 Abnor­
mally'dangerous trespassory activity similarly invokes the, applica­
tion of strict liability. 55 Strict liability is also available to 
compensate injured individuals in the areas of abnonnally danger­
ous activity, 56 products liability,57 workmen's compensation, 58 and 
dangerous animals. 59 
Of the six major areas of individual strict liability, only two .are 
relevant to the discussion in this note: nuisance and abnonnally 
dangerous activity. The supreme judicial court has rejected strict 
liability in trespass60 and products liability.61 Workmen's compen­
sation is governed by a statutory provision that is distinct from 
the MTCA.62 Dangerous animals do not represent a significant 
problem within the Commonwealth. 63 
53. W. PROSSER, supra note 50, § 75, at 495. 
54. Id. § 87, at 575-76; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822, Comment a 
(1965). 
55, W. PROSSER, supra note 50, § 13 at 63-64. 
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 45, at §§ 519-520. 
57. Id. § 402A. 
58. W. PROSSER, supra note 50, § 80, at 525. 
59. Id. § 76, at 496. 
60. No litigation concerning the application of strict liability in trespass has 
been reported in Massachusetts. Moreover, application of this type of strict liability 
has been tacitly foreclosed by Miles v. City of Worcester, 154 Mass. 511, 28 N.E. 676 
(1891), discussed at note 21 supra. 
61. Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 629, 378 N.E.2d 61, 62 
(1978). The legislature's adoption of the most liberal warranty alternative in the 
Massachusetts version of the Uniform Commercial Code, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
106, § 2-318 (West Cum. Supp. 1981), is evidence that the legislature adopted the 
spirit of § 402A. Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 639, 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 
(1978). The Uniform Commercial Code section holds the manufacturer, sell or, lessor, 
or supplier liable for breach of express or implied warranty, regardless of privity 
with the plaintiff, if the injured party was one whom the defendant could reasonably 
have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 106, § 2-318 (West Cum. Supp., 1981). The Swartz court found an endorsement 
of § 402A unnecessary: strict liability for injury caused by defective products in 
Massachusetts will be applied only through breach of warranty. 375 Mass. at 629, 
378 N.E.2d at 62. 
62. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). 
63. Dangerous animals would most likely be found in a zoo or wildlife pre­
serve. The number of private or government owned or operated enterprises of this 
type within the Commonwealth is quite small. The most recently reported case in 
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The court, however, has applied strict liability to nuisance64 
and abnormally dangerous activity.65 Nuisance that creates an ab­
normally dangerous situation may be considered under the general 
classification of abnormally dangerous activity. 66 The difference be­
tween an abnormally dangerous nuisance and an abnormally dan­
gerous activity per se lies not in any concept of liability but in rem­
edy. Nuisances may be remedied in three ways: The court may 
award the plaintiff damages for deprivation of the use and enjoy­
ment of his land; the court may enjoin the nuisance; or the plaintiff 
may undertake the self-help remedy of abatement. 67 Abnormally 
dangerous activity, however, is remedied only through damages. 68 
On the other hand, liability is identical for abnormally dangerous 
nuisances and abnormally dangerous activities per se. The focus of 
this note is on liability; therefore, abnormally dangerous nuisance 
activity will be considered subsumed into abnormally dangerous ac­
tivity. 
Individuals engaged in abnormally dangerous activity are held 
strictly liable for damage and injury because society has made a 
judgment that the social utility of the activity is outweighed by the 
risk of harm it poses. 69 The rationale behind strict liability is that 
the price to be paid for engaging in abnormally dangerous activity 
is liability without fault. 70 
the Commonwealth involving strict liability and dangerous animals arose in 1960 
when a zebra escaped from the Eastern States Exposition. Smith v. Jalbert, 351 
Mass. 432, 435-36, 221 N.E.2d 744, 746 (1966). 
64. For a discussion of nuisance in Kurtigian and Miles, see note 24 supra. The 
court has specifically applied strict liability in nuisance to government activity. 
Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. at 614, 296 N.E.2d at 463. The 
maintenance of large, uncontained supplies of road salt within a populated area in 
Morash qualified as "conduct which is abnormal and out of place in its surround­
ings," W. PROSSER, supra note 50, § 87, at 574, and thus constituted strict liability in 
nuisance. 
65. The Rylands doctrine was accepted by the court in Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 
582 (1868), cited in Clarke-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., Inc., 367 Mass. 70, 76, 
323 N.E.2d 876, 879 (1975). In Clarke-Aiken, the court accepted the position of the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 54, at §§ 519-520 concerning strict li­
ability and abnormally dangerous activity. [d. at 89-91,323 N.E.2d at 886-87. 
66. See note 54 supra. ' 
67. W. PROSSER, supra note 50, §§ 90 at 602-06. 
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 54, at § 519, Comment d. 
69. W. PROSSER, supra note 50, § 75, at 494-95. Social utility is measured by 
the benefits which the actor and the community derive from the activity. Id. at 495. 
70. Comment, Absolute Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 MIL. 
L. REV. 53, 55 (1973). 
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IV. STRICT LIABILITY AND GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY 
Statutory approaches to government liability vary among the 
jurisdictions and form a continuum.71 At one end of this continuum 
is New York, which considers government liability the norm and 
immunity the exception. 72 California appears at the opposite end of 
the spectrum with government immunity as the norm and specific 
liabilities the exception. 73 Several jurisdictions along the contin­
uum create a private strict liability cause of action for abnormally 
dangerous activity and apply such liability to government activity. 
New York,74 Oregon,75 and Washington76 all accept strict liability 
71. Note, supra note 2, at 543. 
72. [d. 
73. [d. 
74. New York recently endorsed a strict liability cause of action against the 
government in Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 448, 368 N.E.2d 
24, 27, 398 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (1977). Strict liability is limited, however, by the re­
quirement that the defendant's activity be shown to be the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries. [d. at 453,368 N.E.2d at 30,398 N.Y.S.2d at 407. 
75. Oregon, while not specifically endorsing the application of strict liability to 
government activity, has applied the concept to individual activity which is 
ultrahazardous. McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, 327, 467 P.2d 
635, 637 (1970). The Oregon Supreme Court, however, tacitly recognized strict liabil­
ity actions a,gainst the government in its exceptionally broad construction of the 
Oregon Tort Claims Act. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260-300 (1973), contrued in Dow­
ers Farms, Inc. v. Lake County, 288 Or. 669, 607 P.2d 1361 (1980). 
The court in Dowers Farms stated: 
[T]he Tort Claims Act was intended to be remedial legislation, allowing all 
citizens to seek redress for any tort committed by their governments, except 
for specific immunities listed in the statutes . ... A narrow statutory con­
struction of the provisions of the Tort Claims Act would be contrary to its 
general remedial purposes. 
288 Or. at __, 607 P.2d at 1367 (emphasis added). Nowhere in the Oregon statute is 
the government immunized against strict liability for ultrahazardous activity. 
76. A Washington Supreme Court decision, Edgar v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 217, 
222-23, 595 P.2d 534, 539, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1077 (1979), used the same 
rationale as the Oregon decision, holding that the State of Washington, under its 
statutes, is liable for damages arising from any tortious activity if the plaintiff can 
show that a private cause of action exists for the factual situation at hand. The 
Washington Supreme Court has indicated several times that a private cause of action 
exists in strict liability for ultrahazardous activity. The most recent of these decisions 
is Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 860-61, 567 P.2d 218, 221 (1977). In 
an earlier case, Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 59, 64, 491 
P.2d 1037, 1040 (1971), the court was on the verge of applying strict liability to gov­
ernment activity but declined to do so because the activity in that case was not 
deemed ultrahazardous. It is interesting to note that the court felt that the plaintiff's 
case was a meritorious one and granted relief on a theory of res ipsa loquitur. [d. at 
67, 491 P.2d at 1041. See also notes 82-90 infra and accompanying text. 
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to some degree within their tort claims acts. In California, where 

one would expect the immunity norm to rule out strict liability, 

the courts and legislature have applied the doctrine in practice 

. without specifically endorsing it. 77 The federal government78 and 

Iowa,79 however, have excluded strict liability from their tort 

claims acts. . 

Professor Marc Franklin, a prominent torts scholar, has writ­
ten that California and New York tort decisions are influential and 
rarely atypical. 8o Further, decisions from those two states usually 
become models for other states to follow. 81 A trend may be devel­
oping since abnormally dangerous government activity has been sub­
jected to strict liability to some degree in four of the six jurisdic­
tions where the issue has been litigated and since New York and 
California are among those four states. Whether Massachusetts will 
interpret its tort claims act to encompass strict liability for govern­
ment's abnormally dangerous activities will be considered below in 
two stages: The first addresses the general policies that might 
justify strict liability; the second delves into the sources authorizing 
Massachusetts courts to apply strict liability to government activity. 
V. JUSTIFICATION FOR APPLYING STRICT LIABILITY 

TO GOVERNMENT ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY 

A. Argument for Strict Liability 
Holding the government strictly liable for its abnormally dan­
gerous· activities eliminates four major problems associated with 
77. California accepted the application of strict liability to private ultra­
hazardous activity under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 54, § 519 
in Orser v. George, 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 672-73, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708, 717 (1967). The 
California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOY'T CODE §§ 810-996 (West 1980), has been in­
terpreted to allow recovery in nuisance cases involVing aircraft noise. The court in 
Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 937, 496 P.2d 480, 491, 101 Cal. Rptr. 
568, 579 (1972), held that the government was liable, under the Tort Claims Act, 
CAL. GOY'T CODE § 815 (West 1980), for aircraft noise since it was a nuisance under 
CAL. GOY'T CODE § 3479 (West 1980). 
78. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802-03, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 902 
(1972). 
79. Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Iowa 1977). 
80. M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIYES 
xix (2d ed. 1979). 
81. [d. A concurring opinion in a California case, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), is considered to be the origin of the doc­
trine of strict liability for defective products. The decision by the New York Court of 
Appeals in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), is con­
sidered to be the leading tort case on proximate cause. 
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compensating tortiously injured individuals. First, an innocent, tor­
tiously injured individual still has a claim even though a remedy is 
not available in strict liability. To provide compensation, the judici­
ary must engage in the inequitable and convoluted process of cir­
cumventing strict liability.82 The courts, including those in 
Massachusetts,83 grant relief by straining other doctrines84 such as 
res ipsa loquitur,85 trespass,86 nondelegable duty,87 taking of prop­
erty,88 and nuisance. 89 None of these theories, however, provides 
total liability coverage for abnormally dangerous activity. As a re­
sult, liability for abnormally dangerous activity is determined on a 
case-by-case basis. Plaintiff's recovery is directly proportionate to 
his skill in manipulating the facts to conform to one of the causes of 
action mentioned above. 
Rejecting strict liability also subverts a major purpose underly­
ing the abolition of government immunity:9o To relieve injured in­
dividuals from bearing the costs of the government's torts. 91 
Placing this burden on an individual is inconsistent with the values 
embraced by a democratic society.92 
Without a strict liability cause of action, tort issues that 
should be litigated in the courts are handled by other, less appro­
priate procedures. 93 As a result, relief may be obtained only by 
submitting private bills for compensation to the legislature.94 The 
legislature has granted damage awards only in the wake of major 
catastrophes. An example is the 1947 Texas City fertilizer explo­
sions where 300 separate claims totalling two hundred million dol­
82. Comment, supra note 70, at 71. 
83. See the discussion of Kurtigian at note 21 supra. 
84. Comment, supra note 70, at 70-71. 
85. Jacoby, Absolute Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 FED. B.J. 
5, 6 (1966), Comment, supra note 70, at 66. 
86. Comment, supra note 70, at 67. See Reynolds, Strict Liability Under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act: Does "Wrongful" Cover a Few Sins, No Sins or Non-Sins?, 
23 AM. U. L. REV. 813, 818-19 (1974). 
87. Comment, supra note 70, at 69. 
88. Id. at 70. 
89. Reynolds, supra note 86, at 818-19. 
90. Note, The Supreme Court and the Tort Claims Act: End of an Enlightened 
Era?, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 267, 283 (1978). 
91. ld. 
92. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 879 n.12. 
93. Note, Torts-Federal Tort Claims Act-Sonic Boom-Cause of Action 
Based in Absolute Liability Not Actionable Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 48 
NOTRE DAME LAW. 727, 732 (1973). 
94. ld. 
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lars were filed. 95 The United States Supreme Court denied recov­
ery, forcing plaintiffs to seek relief in Congress by private bill. 96 
The private bill procedure generally is considered to be inequitable 
since tort issues may be subordinated to political considerations. 
The sheer number of private bills, the inadequacy of legislative 
factfinding tools, and pressure by the bills' proponents97 all make 
the legislature an inappropriate forum for resolution of tort issues. 
Several tort claims acts have explicitly stated an intent to eliminate 
the private bill procedure. 98 
Unless a remedy is available in strict liability, therefore, the 
government may engage in abnormally dangerous activity with 
impunity. A major tenet of tort law, the regulation of conduct, 99 
is thus emasculated. In 1944 California Supreme Court Justice 
Roger J. Traynor discussed the policies that led him to apply strict 
liability when a waitress was injured by an exploding bottle of Coca 
Cola: loo public policy dictated that responsibility be fixed where 
it would reduce hazards to life and health most effectively.IOI Al­
though Justice Traynor was speaking in the context of products lia­
bility, his reasoning is also pertinent ·to abnormally dangerous ac­
tivity. Placing responsibility on the government would deter 
carelessness in the government's pursuit of abnormally dangerous 
activities. 
B. Arguments Against Strict Liability 
The major argument against applying strict liability to govern­
ment activity is the same one that was levelled against the abolition 
of government immunity: costs are potentially staggering. I02 A 
95. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17 (1953). 
96. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972). Although relief was granted by 
private bill, the process was both costly and lengthy. ld. 
97. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1951). 
98. ld. (expressing the purpose of the FTCA); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1 (Ct. CI. Act, 
Hist. Note) (McKinney 1963). 
99. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 
436,440-41 (1944) (Traynor, ]., concurring). 
100. ld. at 456, 150 P.2d at 437. 
101. ld. 
102. Note, supra note 2, at 532. In fiscal year 1964, when sovereign immunity 
was still the law, 580 claims were filed against the Commonwealth under the limited 
Massachusetts claims settlement procedure. Those claims were settled by the attor­
ney general for slightly more than $110,000. MASS. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUN­
CIL, REP. ON SENATE BILL 990, 77 (January 1965). When one considers that the 
Commonwealth has 14 counties, 39 cities, 312 towns, and numerous boards and 
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leading commentator in this area considers this argument invalid 
because the government may use general funds to compensate tort 
victims and thereby distribute the costs through the tax system. l03 
In Massachusetts compensation is limited by the MTCA. Sec­
tion 4 of the Act requires that administrative remedies be ex­
hausted before a lawsuit is initiated against the government. l04 
Early settlement of claims is encouraged by section 5 of the Act, 
which removes an external approval requirement for payment of 
claims under $2,500 and requires only the approval of the govern­
ment attorney for payment of claims between $2,500 and $20,000. 
Settlements between $20,000 and $100,000 need be approved only 
by the secretary of administration and finance. l05 The ultimate ef­
fect of sections 4 and 5 of the Act is to direct claims from the 
courts to administrative agencies. lOS 
committees, the potentially staggering costs of unrestricted abolition of government 
immunity become apparent. MASSACHUSETTS FACTS, 8 (1976). 
103. Reynolds, supra note 86, at 833. 
104. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). 

§ 4. Prerequisites to Civil Action; ... Limitation of Action 

A civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer on a 
claim for damages under this chapter unless the claimant shall have first 
presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such public em­
ployer within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose, 
and such claim shall have been finally denied by such executive officer in 
writing and sent by certified or registered mail, or as otherwise provided by 
this section. The failure of the executive officer to deny such claim in writ ­
ing within six months after the date upon which it was presented, or the fail­
ure to reach final arbitration, settlement or compromise of such claim ac­
cording to the provisions of section five, shall be deemed a final denial of 
such claim. No civil action shall be brought more than three years after the 
date upon which such cause of action accrued. Disposition of any claim by 
the executive officer of a public employer shall not be competent evidence 
of liability or amount of damages. 
105. [d. 
§ 5. Arbitration, Compromise, Settlement, and Release of Claims; ... 
The executive officer of a public employer may arbitrate, compromise or 
settle any claim for damages under this chapter; provided, that any award, 
compromise or settlement in excess of two thousand five hundred dollars 
shall be made only with the prior approval of the public attorney for such 
public employer; provided further, however, that in any case where the pub­
lic employer is the commonwealth, any award, compromise or settlement in 
excess of twenty thousand dollars shall be made only with the prior approval 
of the secretary of administration and finance .... 
106. It may seem incongruous to state that legislative settlement of claims is 
unfair and yet to encourage administrative settlement. The two positions are consistent, 
however. There is no alternative in the event of an unsatisfactory legislative settle­
ment. Under the MTCA, on the other hand, an unsatisfactory administrative settle­
ment offer may be rejected and a judicial remedy pursued. See note 104 supra. 
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The possibility of staggering costs also is reduced by the maxi­
mum recovery limit, $100,000 on each claim, set by the Act. 107 In 
addition, the sting of damages is softened by section 8 of the 
MTCA, which authorizes the government to purchase liability in­
surance. 108 
Section 11 of the MTCA promises to have the most chilling ef­
fect on frivolous lawsuits. 109 In the event of a judgment against the 
plaintiff and a determination by the court that the action was frivo­
lous or in bad faith, the court may order judgment against the 
plaintiff for costs. 110 
In addition to these legislative limitations, several doctrinal 
limitations also will prevent staggering costs. The supreme judicial 
court considers strict liability feasible only if defendant's act or 
omission is the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. H1 The Re­
statement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) provides the government 
with two possible defenses: Assumption of risk;112 and, to a very 
limited extent, contributory negligence. 113 When this note was 
published, however, neither of these defenses to strict liability had 
been accepted in Massachusetts. 
The staggering costs argument against strict liability, there­
fore, is unfounded because of the cost-limiting effects of both the 
MTCA and the limitations imposed by the doctrines of proximate 
107. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). 
108. [d. § 8. 
109. [d. 
§ ll. Frivolous claims; costs; subsequent actions 
If the judgment in any action brought under this chapter is in favor of 
the public employer, judgment for costs and execution thereon may issue in 
favor of the public employer, if the court finds the action brought by the 
claimant to have been frivolous or in bad faith, and final judgment on the ac­
tion shall be a bar to any other or further action being brought on the same 
claim or subject matter. 
llO. None of the other tort claims acts examined in this article has such a re­
strictive provision. Although no statistics are yet available on the total amount of 
claims paid under the MTCA, the chilling effect of §§ 4, 5, and II should reduce po­
tential claims costs. 
Ill. Clarke-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., Inc., 367 Mass. at 90 n.21, 323 
N.E.2d at 887 n.21. 
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 45, at § 523. The plaintiff 
must knowingly and voluntarily proceed to encounter the risk by coming within 
range of it. [d. Comment e. 
ll3. [d. § 524. In general, plaintiff is not barred from recovery in strict liability 
by his or her own negligence. ld. In the infrequent circumstances when the plaintiff's 
conduct consists of unreasonable and intentional exposure to a risk of harm from an 
abnormally dangerous activity, he is barred from recovery. [d. Comment ~. 
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cause, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. Denying a 
strict liability cause of action is contrary to public policy and forces 
injured individuals to resort to inappropriate theories of recovery. 
Strict liability should be applied to the government in Massachu­
setts since the argument opposing application is not convincing. 
VI. AUTHORITY TO APPLY STRICT LIABILITY 
Under the MTCA the government is liable for "negligent or 
wrongful acts or omissions. "114 Strict liability for abnormally dan­
gerous activity is not mentioned. Authority, therefore, must be 
drawn from the intent of the legislature and the language of the 
Act. Two phrases within the Act seem to incorporate strict liability: 
The phrase "wrongful act or omission" in section 2; and the phrase 
"liable . . . in the same manner.. . . as a private individual, "115 
also found in section 2. 
The legislature did not intend to immunize the government 
from claims in strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity. 
Rather, the legislature wanted the Act to be liberally construed to 
abolish government immunity.116 Specific immunities are list~d in 
the Act: Discretionary function immunity; immunity in the execu­
tion of statutory duties; and immunity for intentional tortS.117 None 
of these immunities mentions or even alludes to strict liability or 
abnormally dangerous activity.118 
One of these immunities, the discretionary function exception, 
has been used incorrectly119 by some federal courts120 as a bar to 
/ 
114. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). 
115. Id. 
116. See text accompanying note 47 supra. 
117. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 10 (West Cum. Supp. 1981) states: 
§ 10. Application of sections one to eight 

The provisions of sections one to eight, inclusive, shall apply to: ­
(a) any claim based upon an act or omission of a public employee when 

such employee is exercising due care in the execution of any statute or any 

regulation of a public employer, or any municipal ordinance or by-law, 

whether or not such statute, regulation, ordinance or by-law is valid; 

(b) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to 

exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public 

employer or public employee, acting within the scope of his office or em­

ployment, whether or not the discretion involved is abused; 

(c) any claim arising out of intentional tort .... 
118. See id. ch. 258. 
119. See generally Peck, Laird v. Nelms, A Call fer Review and Revision of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 48 WASH. L. REV. 391,410-11 (1973). 
120. See Abraham v. United States, 465 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1972); Maynard v. 
United States, 430 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1970); McMurray v. United States, 286 F. 
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strict liability recovery for government abnormally dangerous activ­
ity. This exception immunizes from liability government activi­
ties that involve judgment and choice of policy.121 Discretionary 
function immunity is widespread among the various tort claims 
acts122 and is set out clearly in section lO(b) of the MTCA.123 Dis­
cretionary function immunity is used to bar government strict lia­
bility because the government decision to engage in abnormal~y 
dangerous activity is based on the unlimited choice of competing 
policies and objectives, the social utility of the activity, and the risk 
of harm. 124 
Discretionary function immunity is not a bar to government 
strict liability in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Supreme Judi­
cial Court, in Clarke-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., 125 ac­
cepted the Restatement formulations of abnormally dangerous activ­
ity and strict liability.126 The court noted that under section 519, 
one who carries on abnormally dangerous activity is subject to lia­
bility for ensuing harm even though he has exercised the utmost 
care to prevent such harm. 127 Section 520 then enumerates six fac­
tors that contribute to a finding of abnormally dangerous activity: 
High degree of risk of harm to person, land, or chattels of another; 
possibility of great harm; inability to eliminate the risk through due 
care; uncommon nature of the activity; inappropriateness of the ac­
tivity to the place of conduct; and extent to which risks outweigh 
social benefits. 128 The Clarke-Aiken court articulated the Restate­
ment's test for determining when strict liability is appropriate: 
U[i]n general, abnormal dangers arise from activities which are in 
themselves unusual, or from unusual risks created by more usual 
activities under particular circumstances ... The essential ques­
tion is whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of 
its magnitude or because of the circumstances surrounding it, as 
to justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm which re­
sults from it, even though it is carried on with all reasonable 
care."129 
Supp. 701 (W.O. Mo. 1968); Schwartz v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 164 (D.N.D. 1965); 
Huslander v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D.N.Y. 1964). 
121. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. at 216-17, 366 N.E.2d at 1215-16. 
122. ld. at 217-18, 366 N.E.2d at 1216. 
123. See note 117 supra for the text of § 10 of the MTCA. 
124. See Peck, supra note 119, at 410. 
125. 367 Mass. 70,323 N.E.2d 876 (1975). 
126. ld. at 89, 323 N.E.2d at 886-87. 
127. Id. 
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 54, at § 520. 
129. 367 Mass. at 89,323 N.E.2d at 886-87 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS, supra note 54, at § 520 Comment f). 
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The court stressed that the nature and extent of the risk rather 
than the nature of the activity should be emphasized. 130 If the gov­
ernment were to plead immunity from liability for abnormally dan­
gerous activity under the discretionary function rule, focus would 
shift to the nature and extent of the risk. Sections 519 and 520 of 
the Restatement then would be invoked and a three-part test ap­
plied. 
Under the Restatement's test, the activity first must be deter­
mined to be abnormally dangerous under the standard of section 
520. If the activity is deemed abnormally dangerous, strict liability 
is applied. Finally, even though the activity is deemed abnormally 
dangerous and the defendant is held strictly liable, the activity 
must be shown to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff' s inju~ 
ries. 131 Because of the shift in focus to the nature and extent of the 
risk, the allegation of abnormally dangerous activity, under this 
test, forecloses judicial inquiry into whether the activity was 
undertaken as the result of a planning or policymaking decision. 
When examination of that decision is foreclosed, the . discretionary 
function immunity becomes inapplicable. 
Only a handful of lower federal courts have used discretionary 
function immunity as a bar to recovery in strict liability actions 
against the federal government. 132 The United States Supreme 
Court has not had the opportunity to consider discretionary func­
tion immunity as a bar to strict liability recovery.133 Justice 
Stewart, in dissent, however, asserted that the discretionary func­
tion immunity is inapplicable as a bar to recovery in strict liability 
against the federal government. 134 He stated that the purpose of 
the discretionary function immunity is to prevent the possibility 
that policy decisions made by the legislative or the executive 
branches might be reviewed by the courts in the context of a tort 
action. 13S Justice Stewart also stated that there is no such danger in 
the area of abnormally dangerous activity because strict liability 
causes of action look to the abnormally dangerous nature of the ac­
tivity rather than the policy decision behind the undertaking. 136 
130. Id. at 89-90,323 N.E.2d at 887. 
131. See note III supra and accompanying text. 
132. See note 120 supra. 
133. In the one case in which the issue arose, Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 
(1972), the Court based its holding on a different rationale; therefore, consideration 
of this issue was deemed unnecessary. Id. at 803. 
134. Id. at 810 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
135. Id. at 811. 
136. Id. at 811-12. 
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Once an activity is deemed abnormally dangerous, liability de­
pends solely on the issue of causation. 137 
Authority to apply strict liability to abnormally dangerous gov­
ernment activity may be implied since the Massachusetts legisla­
ture has not manifested a contrary intent. In fact, the legislature 
specifically stated that the MTCA was to be given a liberal con­
struction in order to abolish government immunity.13S No legisla­
tive history associated with the MTCA indicates an intent to fore­
close strict liability. An argument could be made that the 
discretionary function exception is a tacit bar to strict liability. This 
argument, used in the lower federal courts,139 has not been ad­
dressed in a United States Supreme Court majority opinion and 
has been dismissed as inapplicable in a Supreme Court dissenting 
opinion. 140 Although the issue of whether discretionary function 
immunity bars strict liability has not been litigated in 
Massachusetts, the Commonwealth's case law strongly supports the 
. conclusion reached by Justice Stewart: discretionary function im­
munity is inapplicable as a bar to strict liability.141 Nor does legis­
lative intent prohibit the application of strict liability to the govern­
ment's abnormally dangerous activity. Therefore, implied authority 
to incorporate that type of immunity must be found in the lan­
guage of the MTCA. 
A. The Phrase "Wrongful Acts or Omissions" 
'The first source of implied authority for applying strict liability 
to Massachusetts state and municipal governments is construction 
of the word "wrongful" in section 2 of the MTCA, which assigns 
government liability for "wrongful acts or omissions. "142 Even in 
the absence of Massachusetts precedent construing "wrongful," it is 
inappropriate to draw upon existing federal precedent without a leg­
islative directive to do so. Laird v. Nelms,143 decided by the Su­
preme Court in 1972, construed the word "wrongful," which ap­
pears in section 1346(b) of the FTCA. The Court rejected an 
interpretation that would have resulted in the application of strict 
137. Id. at 812. 
138. 1978 Mass. Acts ch. 512 § 18. 
139. See notes 119-120 supra and accompanying text. 
140. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 810-12 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
141. Id. 
142. See note 1 supra. 
143. 406 U.S. 797 (1972). 
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liability to the govemment. 144 Although the "wrongful" language in 
the MTCA is similar to that in the FTCA, interpretation of the two 
statutes should not necessarily be the same. Neither the legislative 
history145 nor the language of the MTCA indicates whether the 
legislature intended that the two acts be given a similar interpreta­
tion. Legislative silence in this area may mean that the legislature 
did not intend to follow federal interpretive precedent. 
In one prior instance the Massachusetts. legislature told the 
courts the weight to be given federal precedent by including a spe­
cific requirement to follow federal precedent in the Massachusetts 
statute. In the Consumer Protection Act,146 passed eleven years 
before the MTCA, the legislature specifically directed the courts to 
follow federal interpretive precedent. 147 The language of the Con­
sumer Protection Act subject to federal interpretation is identical 
to that in the Federal Trade Commission Act. The MTCA and the 
FTCA, however, do not share the same language. 148 Because the 
legislature specified in a statute the treatment to be accorded fed­
eral precedent, legislative silence in this area with regard to the 
MTCA probably indicates an indifference to federal cases that con­
strue the FTCA. 
Dicta from Packaging Industries Group v. Cheney,149 decided 
in 1980 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, although it 
addresses the scope of direct appellate review, could be read to re­
quire adherence to Laird v. Nelms. 150 The Packaging Industries 
court stated that, when state statutory language "closely tracks" that 
of a federal statute, the court will follow federal interpretive prece­
dent. 15l The section 2 MTCA language, however, does not "closely 
track" section 1346(b) of the FTCA. Two important differences dis­
tinguish the superficially similar language of the two statutes. In 
Poirier v. Superior Court,152 source of the Packaging Industries 
dicta, the language of the Massachusetts statute being construed 
was taken directly from the Norris-LaGuardia Act and inserted into 
144. Id. at 802-03. 
145. See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of MTCA 
legislative history. 
146. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A (West 1972). 

147.' Id. § 2(b). 

148. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). 
149. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189,405 N.E.2d 106. 
150. 406 U.S. at 797. 
151. 1980 Mass Adv. Sh. at 1191,405 N.E.2d at 108-09. 
152. 337 Mass. 522, 150 N.E.2d 558 (1958). 
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the Massachusetts statute via amendment. 153 It is logical to as­
sume, therefore, that the legislature wanted the Massachusetts 
statute to parallel the federal act. In contrast, the MTCA did not 
borrow language from the FfCA,154 so it can be argued that the 
MTCA was not intended to parallel the FfCA. Under the Poirier 
test, therefore, the language of section 2 of the MTCA does not 
"closely track" that of the FTCA. 
The second important difference between the language of sec­
tion 2 of the MTCA and section 1346(b) of the FTCA is the context 
in which the word "wrongful" is used in the two sections. The stat­
utory language in section 1346(b) clearly indicates that federal gov­
ernment tort liability is determined under the substantive tort law 
of the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued. 155 Section 
1346(b) concerns a choice of law question; it does not describe the 
scope of government liability. On the other hand, section 2 of the 
MTCA, entitled "Liability," pertains to the scope of state and local 
government liability in Massachusetts. Because the sectiOn 2 lan­
guage is not used in the same context as the language in section 
1346(b) and does not "closely track" the language of section 
1346(b), the Packaging Industries dicta directing state courts to fol­
low federal precedent is inapplicable. 15s 
Application of the Packaging Industries dicta would have 
brought the Nelms decision almost to the level of mandatory prece­
dent. Without the Packaging Industries dicta, Nelms is merely per­
suasive authority. As persuasive authority, Nelms must be evalu­
ated prior to an application as interpretive precedent for the 
MTCA. 
Few courts have followed Nelms. 157 The decision has been 
criticized widely and vociferously in law review articles. 158 Each of 
153. ld. at 526-27, 150 N.E.2d at 561. 
154. See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text. 
155. Peck, supra note 119, at 392. 
156. Use of federal precedent to interpret the MTCA is appropriate in some 
cases. The determinative factor is whether the particular MTCA language "closely 
tracks" that of the FTCA. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1191,405 N.E.2d at 108-09. 
157. Three courts have applied Nelms strictly to negate a cause of action· 
against federal or state government in strict liability. Medley v. United States, 480 F. 
Supp. r005, 1013 (M.D. Ala. 1979); McGarry v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 525, 531 
(D. Nev. 1973); Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Iowa 1977). 
158. At the time of publication, seven law review articles criticized the Nelms 
decision: Peck, supra note 119; Reynolds, supra note 86; Comment, supra note 70; 
Note, Torts-The Federal Tort Claims Act-Absolute Liability, The Discretionary 
Function Exception, Sonic Boom, Laird v. Nelms, 92 S. Ct. 1899 (1972), 6 AKRON L. 
REV. 105 (1973); Note, supra note 90; Note, Torts-A Definite Pronouncement on the 
1981] MASSACHUSETTS TORT CLAIMS ACT 629 
the several bases of the Court's decision has been denounced. 
The Nelms Court considered itself bound by dicta in Dalehite 
v. United States. 159 Dalehite held that the federal government was 
not liable for extensive damage resulting from fertilizer explosions 
aboard two cargo vessels in the harbor of Texas City, Texas in 
1947. 160 The Nelms Court determined that Dalehite bound it not to 
hold the federal government strictly liable for damage resulting 
from aircraft noise. 161 Dalehite's restriction of strict liability,162 
however, was not a holding in the case but rather mere dicta. l63 
Dicta is not subject to stare decisis. l64 
Even if the Dalehite statement on strict liability were consid­
ered a holding, it would have been restricted severely by Indian 
Towing v. United States165 and Rayonier, Inc. v. United States. 166 
The Indian Towing Court held the federal government liable for 
damages resulting from a negligently maintained lighthouse. The 
Court stated that the FTCA was intended to compensate victims of 
tortious government actiVity in circumstances similar to those ren­
dering a private individual liable. 167 Lower courts were instructed 
not to impose immunity onto a statute designed to limit immu­
nity.168 Rayonier, which held the federal government liable for neg­
ligence in .fighting a forest fire, reaffirmed the Indian Towing 
test. 169 The Court also stated that Dalehite was rejected by Indian 
Federal Tort Claims Act-Strict Liability· Eliminated, 9 GA. ST. B.J. 342 (1973); 
Note, supra note 93, at 727. This author was unable to find a single law review arti­
cle which evaluates Nelms as a sound and logical decision. 
159. 346 U.S. 15 (1953). 
160. Id. at 17. 
161. 406 U.S. at 802-03. 
162. Id. at 44-45. 
163. "[Lliability does not arise by virtue of either United States ownership of 
an 'inherently dangerous commodity' or property, or of engaging in an 'extra hazard­
ous' activity." 346 U.S. at 45. Commentators have construed this statement and the 
discussion accompanying it as dicta. Peck, supra note 119, at 398; Reynolds, supra 
note 86, at 816; Note, Torts-The Federal Tort Claims Act-Absolute Liability, The 
Discretionary Function Exception, Sonic Boom, Laird v. Nelms, 92 S. Ct. 1899 
(1972), supra note 158, at 107; Note, Torts-A Definite Pronouncement on the Fed­
eral Tort Claims Act-Strict Liability Eliminated, supra note 158, at 348. 
164. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 45, at 1261. 
165. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). 
166. 352 U.S. 315 (1957). See also Peck, supra note 119, at 396; Comment, su­
pra note 70, at 64-65; Note, Torts-The Federal Tort Claims Act-Absolute Liability, 
The Discretionary Function Exception, Sonic Boom, Laird v. Nelms, 92 S. Ct. 1899 
(1972), supra note 158, at 107-08. 
167. 350 U.S. at 68. 
168. Id. at 69. 
169. 352 U.S. at 319. 
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Towing to the extent that it contradicted Indian Towing. 17o United 
States v. Praylou,171 decided by the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the Fourth Circuit, also was cited in Rayonier as support 
for Indian Towing's narrowing of Dalehite. 172 In Pray lou , the 
Fourth Circuit held the government strictly liable under North 
Carolina law for damages from an airplane crash. 173 The Nelms ma­
jority opinion rejecting strict liability did not mention the Indian 
Towing and Rayonier restrictions of Dalehite or Rayonier's tacit ap­
proval of strict liability for government activity. 
The legislative history of the FTCA, which was relied upon by 
the Dalehite and Nelms Courts to determine legislative intent with 
regard to government strict liability, is inconclusive at best. 174 
Three different versions of the FTCA's legislative history, one in 
the Dalehite majority opinion, one in the Nelms majority opinion, 
and one in the Nelms dissent, are cited regarding congressional in­
tent concerning the application of strict liability to the federal gov­
ernment. The Dalehite version of the FTCA legislative history was 
drawn from Senate committee discussion that took place during 
the Seventy-sixth Congress indicating that "wrongful" was intended 
to cover actions, such as trespass, that were not strictly negli­
gent. 175 The Court in Nelms cited a House committe.e memoran­
dum discussing a Seventy-seventh Congress House draft bill. 176 
This 1942 draft bill included a discretionary function exception 
which exempted planning and policymaking decisions and value 
judgments from review to prevent suits against the government for 
legally authorized acts. The draft was never enacted into law. 177 
Nelms' dissent cited legislative history from the 1946 bill that was 
passed and enacted into the FTCA.178 Joint committee discussion 
indicates that the bill was designed to establish a uniform system 
permitting actions to be initiated on " 'any tort claim . . . with the 
170. [d. 
171. 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953). 
172. 352 U.S. at 319 n.2. 
173. 208 F .2d at 295. 
174. Reynolds, supra note 86, at 815-16; Note, Torts-The Federal Tort Claims 
Act-Absolute Liability, The Discretionary Function Exception, Sonic Boom, Laird v. 
Nelms, 92 S. Ct. 1899 (1972), supra note 158, at 108. 
175. 346 U.S. at 45. 
176. 406 U.S. at 801-02 (citing to Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 at 65-66 (1942)). 
177. 406 U.S. at-801-02. 
178. [d. at 805-07. 
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exception of certain classes of torts expressly exempted from the 
operation of the act.' "179 
Of these three versions, the one that is most convincing is 
that cited by the Nelms dissent. Although the other statements of 
legislative history are relevant, the history that is most recent 
and most closely associated with the statute is determinative. 18o 
Since the version cited by the Nelms dissent has the most weight, 
congressional intent may be inferred to allow a cause of action in 
strict liability against the federal government. This congressional 
intent would make the Nelms holding on strict liability incorrect 
and the Nelms decision useless in interpreting the MTCA. "Wrong­
ful" may therefore be construed to include strict liability. 
Massachusetts case law does not specifically define what con­
stitutes a "wrongful" act. In Massachusetts, however, a tortious act 
is defined as one that will subject the actor to subsequent liabil­
ity.l8l Under section 519 of the Restatement, accepted in 
Massachusetts,182 abnormally dangerous activity subjects the actor 
to strict liability. Abnormally dangerous activity, therefore, is tor­
tious. Tortious activity is widely defined as wrongful activity.183 
Thus, since abnormally dangerous activity is both tortious and 
wrongful, it is actionaple under the phrase "liable for . . . wrongful 
acts or omissions"184 which appears in section 2 of the MTCA. 
B. 	 The Phrase "Liable in the Same Manner . .. 
as a Private Individual" 
The phrase "liable in the same manner and to the same extent 
as a private individual under like circumstances, "185 which appears 
in section 2 of the MTCA, mandates the use of strict liability 
against the government. Since strict liability for abnormally danger­
179. 	 Id. at 806-07. 
180. See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 254 (1956) (construing the Portal to 
Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 254, 251-262 (1976». 
181. Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. at 621, 296 N.E.2d at 
467; Rogers v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 265 Mass. 544, 546-47, 164 N.E. 463, 463 
(1929). 
182. Clarke-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., Inc., 367 Mass. at 89-90, 323 
N.E.2d at 886-87. 
183. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 45, at 1335. See Howard's Adm'r v. 
Hunter, 126 Ky. 685, 689-90, 104 S.w. 723, 724 (1907); Judson v. Peoples Bank & 
Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 91, llO A.2d 24, 35 (1954); Kelly v. Mohrhusen, 50 
Wis. 2d 337, 341, 184 N.W.2d 149, 151 (1971). 
184. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). 
185. 	 Id. 
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ous activity is a viable private cause of action in Massachusetts, 186 
it could be applied to government activity under section 2 of the 
MTCA. 
Use of the phrase "liable . . . as a private individual" was pro­
posed as the test of federal government liability in both Indian 
Towing v. United States187 and Rayonier, Inc. v. United States. 188 
In the jurisdictions that allow a cause of action in strict liability 
against the government,189 the Indian Towing test is used to con­
struct a scheme of government liability that parallels that of a 
private individual. 
Use of the phrase "liable . . . as a private individual" as a 
source of authority most likely will be criticized in Massachusetts 
as a construction that is not commensurate with the legislature's 
original intention. This criticism is unfounded with regard to the 
MTCA. The legislature stated a brief but specific intent that "The 
provisions of this act shall be construed liberally for the accom­
plishment of the purposes thereof,"190 that purpose being "to abol­
ish government immunity."191 At least three jurisdictions use the 
Indian Towing test to allow a strict liability cause of action against 
the government. 192 The section 2 phrase "liable . . . as a private 
individual" supports application of the Indian Towing test in 
Massachusetts. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Massachusetts was one of the last five states to retain govern­
ment tort immunity. The doctrine of government immunity, 
consisting of sovereign and municipal immunity, was firmly en­
trenched in Massachusetts until 1973. In five decisions from 1973 
to 1977 the supreme judicial court hinted to the legislature that ab­
olition of government immunity was a task better suited to the leg­
islature than to the judiciary. As a result of these hints the MTCA 
finally was enacted on July 20, 1978. The MTCA specifically allows 
recovery against the government on a negligence theory but not on 
a strict liability theory. 
186. See note 65 supra. 
187. 350 U.S. 61,61 (1955). 
188. 352 U.S. 315, 315 (1957); see notes 167-172 supra and accompanying text. 
189. See notes 72-77 supra and accompanying text. 
190. See notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text. 
191. Id. 
192. Those jurisdictions are New York, Oregon, and Washington. See notes 
74-76 supra. 
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Strict liability is liability without fault. It is applicable when 
the social utility of an activity is outweighed by the risk of harm. 
Under American tort law in general, whether a jurisdiction takes 
an expansive approach to government liability, as New York does, 
or a restrictive approach, as California does, strict liability is a suit­
able cause of action when the government engages in abnormally 
dangerous activity. 
Strict liability will eliminate the difficulties currently facing 
Massachusetts courts. In the absence of strict liability the courts 
must resort to inappropriate legal theories to grant relief to tor­
tiously injured plaintiffs. Relief should be granted in a direct strict 
liability cause of action: innocent individuals then will be compen­
sated for injuries caused by the government's abnormally danger­
ous activities. In addition, relief will be granted through judicial 
rather than legislative proceedings. Finally, the government will be 
compelled to exercise a higher standard of care in the conduct of 
abnormally dangerous activities. 
Nothing in Massachusetts statutes or case law explicitly allows 
or explicitly bars strict liability actions against the government for 
abnormally dangerous activity. Implied authority, however, may be 
drawn from two phrases in the language of section 2 of the MTCA. 
The phrase "wrongful acts or omissions" may be construed to in­
clude strict liability. The phrase "liable ... as a private individual" 
has been proposed as the test for federal tort liability and is the 
test for government liability in several jurisdictions that allow 
strict liability actions against the government. 
The judiciary and the legislature might choose not to recog­
nize the section 2 language as an implied source of authority for 
strict liability's application to the government. If those two 
branches of government view the arguments with disfavor, it will 
be incumbent upon the legislature to mandate the application of 
. strict liability to government abnormally dangerous activity in 
Massachusetts. The application of strict liability transfers the cost of 
abnormally dangerous government activity from the innocent vic­
tims of the activity to the government and ultimately to the general 
public, which benefits from the activity. 
Massachusetts has taken a great step forward with the enact­
ment of the MTCA. The Commonwealth's progress in compensa­
ting tortiously injured individuals should continue through judicial 
recognition or legislative provision of a cause of action against the 
government in strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity. 
Joseph H. Reinhardt 
